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Abstract
We show how to design secure authentication protocols for a non-standard class of scenarios. In these authentication is
not bootstrapped from a PKI, shared secrets or trusted third parties, but rather using a minimum of work by human user(s)
implementing the low-band width unspoofable channels between them. We develop both pairwise and group protocols
which are essentially optimal in human effort and, given that, computation. We compare our protocols with recent pairwise
protocols proposed by, for example, Hoepman and Vaudenay. We introduce and analyse a new cryptographic primitive—a
digest function—that is closely related to short-output universal hash functions.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Imagine that a group of people come together and agree that they want to transfer data between them
securely, meaning that they want it to be secret and of authenticated origin. They all have some pieces of
computing hardware (e.g., a mobile phone or a PDA). Unfortunately none of them knows the unique name of
any of the others’ equipment, and in any case there is no PKI which encompasses them all. How can they achieve
their goal in the context that their machines are connected by an insecure network (whether created by WIFI,
the internet, telephony, or a mixture of these)?
The conventional answer to this question would be that this goal is unachievable, since it is impossible
to prevent some impostor I playing the man-in-the-middle between the participants. However a little creative
thinking can easily solve the problem: if each person tells the others (using human conversation) a public key
for his or her machine, they can then use something like the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe protocol [27] (over the
insecure network) to establish secure and authenticated communication. (If there aremore than two participants
then they would either have to adapt that protocol or to use it multiple times.) They will have bypassed the
intruder for the crucial step of exchanging electronic identities.
The problem with that approach is that it requires too much human effort for practical purposes. In this
paper, we introduce some much better methods. The danger of combinatorial attacks means that we require
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more subtle analysis than with traditional authentication protocols, but develop two principles and the concept
of a digest function that together lead to the development of efﬁcient protocols.
Our protocols were, in the main, developed before we were aware of several other recent (pairwise) protocols
reported in [21,22,37,8]. We compare ours against these others, comparing both the amount of human and
computational resources required by the different styles.
We introduce a number of different protocols in this paper that are suitable for many different sizes and types
of group, all the way from pairwise connection between the systems of people who completely trust each other,
to a lecture theatre full or more, for example. This, and the range of potential implementation technologies,
mean that in this paper we largely abstract away the details that are not immediately important to security. We
also have imagined that there is a preliminary and insecure group set-up protocol (implementation dependent)
that is run either before or simultaneously to the ﬁrst messages of the secure protocol.
This paper is organised as follows: in the next section we give some arguments as to why this class of
protocols is important, show how protocols for this type of scenario can be vulnerable to combinatorial attacks,
and analyse how others have solved this problem. In Section 3 we introduce a class of efﬁcient group formation
protocols that rely on trust and which seem particularly appropriate for a user’s equipment to set up secure
communications with a group of simple devices. In Section 4 we show how to build groups securely even when
corrupt participants are present in the group, using extra computation to dispense with the need for trust. We
then analyse the requirement of the digest function our protocols use and suggest some implementations. Finally
we analyse the relative efﬁciency of our protocols and those of [21,22,37,8], and look to future veriﬁcation work.
1.1. Contribution
The original contribution of this paper is ﬁrst represented by the protocols we introduce, which efﬁciently
solve a problem that we believe to be of great practical importance. The second main contribution is the
creation of efﬁciently computable digest functions that share some similarities to short-output uniform families
of hash functions and universal hash functions as originally deﬁned in [38,11], that can be considered perfect for
cryptographic purposes.
2. Background
The use of public key infrastructures, trusted third parties, or shared secrets will be anywhere from incon-
venient to impossible in emerging pervasive computing applications. Equally, even when these are present they
frequently only identify nodes by their ID ﬁelds—often completely inappropriate in the world of lightweight,
human-driven communication. We are much more likely to identify the intended participants by some aspect
of their context: for example a node’s human user or its physical nature and position.
This has been recognised in the development and popularity of the Bluetooth protocol, though this has
been recognised as having signiﬁcant security ﬂaws. Unfortunately it has the weakness of only being usable
in (usually local) situations where there is a secret shared password, and is subject to severe off-line password
guessing attacks [23].
It has been widely realised that it is impossible to bootstrap security from nothing. Nevertheless, as we have
discussed above, it is necessary to be able to bootstrap it from minimal assumptions. So what is it reasonable
to assume exists prior to an attempt to acquire a high-quality security? There have been (at least) two separate
approaches to this. One is to assume that the pair of parties, who are seeking to exchange a strong secret key,
already share some short or low-entropy secret such as a password. The other assumes the existence of a low-
bandwidth empirical channels that are not susceptible to spooﬁng, though they are liable to be overheard or
blocked by the intruder.1 Based on either assumption, the parties can agree on a strong shared secret from
scratch.
1 In the presence of blocking and overhearing, and the absence of spooﬁng, there is a further question: is the channel delayable. We will
assume that these channels are not substantially delayable in the sense that a message blocked in one protocol run can be delayed until a
subsequent one.
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The ﬁrst method, which is based on possessing a shared password, has been studied extensively in the last
decade. Bluetooth itself is such a protocol, but a weak one as discussed above. The community then came upwith
various formal frameworks presented in [3,4,5,9,10] by Bellare, Pointcheval, Rogaway, Canetti, and Krawczyk
and others that focus on preventing off-line dictionary attacks that Bluetooth allows in [23]. These ensure that
the only way that an attacker can ﬁnd out whether his random guess of the password is correct or not is by
interacting with the legitimate player. Typically these reduce the probability of a successful attack to that of
guessing the password correctly in a single trial.
The need to keep the password secret in these precludes their use in scenarios subject to eavesdropping,
including most remote ones since the password cannot be transmitted without pre-existing security that would
render the protocol redundant.
Taking a different approach that makes use of the empirical channel, in [12,13,14,15] Roscoe, Creese, Gold-
smith, Zakiuddin and others attempted to form a secure network for both two-party and multi-party scenarios.
However, as shown below, their scheme is vulnerable to a combinatorial attack, related to the birthday paradox.
There has been also other work that concentrates on two-party protocols, presented in [21,22,37,8,2,16] by
Hoepman, Vaudenay, Balfanz, Gehrmann, Mitchell, Nyberg and others.
2.1. Combinatorial attack on a group formation protocol
The following protocol was originally proposed in [14], where shorthash and longhash are hash functions with
short and long outputs, respectively.
Group protocol of Creese, Roscoe, and others
1. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : A, PkA,NA
2. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : {all Messages 1,N ′A}PkA′
3a. A displays : shorthash({all Messages 2d }), number of processes
3b. ∀A −→E ∀A′ : users compare hashes and check numbers
4. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : longhash({all Messages 2d })
Here, ∀Ameans that amessage is sent or received by all parties in the groupGwho attempt to achieve a secure
link between their laptops or PDAs. PkA stands for an uncertiﬁcated public key for A. The superscript Message
2d represents the decrypted content ofMessage 2. In addition,Message 4 in this protocol does not add any extra
security to the scheme, its presence only aims to provide a conﬁrmation of the shared secret information.
The protocol uses two types of channel:
• −→N , the normal Dolev–Yao network where all messages transmitted between the laptops in this channel
can be overheard, deleted or modiﬁed by the intruder.
• −→E indicates the low-bandwidth empirical channel, typically implemented by human users, which is similar
to the authentic channel used in [21,22], and not susceptible to spooﬁng.
This protocol introduced, implicitly, the ﬁrst of two principles which underlie the new protocols we will be
describing in this paper:
P1 Make all the parties who are intended to be part of a protocol run empirically agree a short-output hash
or digest2 of a complete description of the run.
In all the protocols we introduce in this paper, the “complete description of the run” is identiﬁed with INFOS ,
the collection of all the information that any member of the group wishes to have authenticated to it: the
concatenation of pairs of the form (A, INFOA). Once the agreement required in P1 has occurred then, unless
there is a hash or digest anomaly—different nodes in the group computing the same hash value or digest from
different antecedents—then all the parties agree on all the data transmitted during the protocol.
2 A digest function here means a type of short-output hash function that we will formally specify in Section 3 and analyse in Section 5.
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Wecan state the impactofP1 in the following theorem. In this,A is thenameof anode that it uses electronically,
whereas  and  are the identities of nodes as perceived in the human world, formally through the outgoing
empirical channels they have. An identity of this second sort might be the human user of the node or some
composition of position andnature.One of themain purposes of our protocolswill be binding “logical identities”
such as A to “empirical identities” such as .
Theorem 1
(1)Suppose that, in a given protocol, a pair  and  of trustworthy nodes empirically agree on a hash value that
node  has computed as hash(INFOS), where INFOS includes (A, INFOA) and no other binding to the name A.
Then if  fails to bind INFOA to A then there is a hash anomaly.
(2)Suppose furthermore that  would not have agreed the value unless its own binding was present in INFOS,
and that all other bindings than (A, INFOA) are inconsistent with them being associated with , then in the
absence of a hash anomaly  can reliably bind (A, INFOA) to .
Proof. The proof of part (a) is obvious.
The assumption in Part (b) is that each (A, INFOA) contains information that allows the human user to
correlate it with potential empirical nodes such as .3 The proof of part (b) then follows since we know that 
has announced some logical identity for itself, and none other than A are possible. Of course, if the information
attached to A is also inconsistent with , then  can deduce that  is not reliable. 
Since all our protocols will make use of P1 and this theorem, we need not worry further about the distinction
between logical and empirical nodes: these allow the creation of reliable methods for binding one to the other.
The question that remains with the protocol above is, therefore, whether a hash anomaly is possible. Since
the short hash values in Messages 3a are compared manually by human effort, and not by computer, the length
of the short hash can only be up to a few digits or characters. It turns out that it is not hard for an intruder,
in a limited amount of time, to search for a collision that might cause the parties to agree on different secret
information; and thereby to force an anomaly in the sense described above.
Theattack canbedescribedas follows: the intruderwill run twoparallel sessionswith twosubsetsS1 andS2 that
partition the group G of N parties. During the two parallel runs, the intruder impersonates all parties of subset
S1, by modifying messages sent from subset S1 with different public keys where she knows the corresponding
secret keys, to talk to parties in the other subset, S2, and vice versa. Therefore, any one in the group G is still
thinking that s/he is running the protocol with the other (N − 1) parties. The intruder only allows messages to
be passed unaltered within each subset, but when a message is intended to go across the boundary between the
two subsets its content will be changed appropriately.
If S1 = {A,B,C}, S2 = {D,E}, and {N ′A,N ′B,N ′C ,N ′D,N ′E} are the original nonces randomly created by all the
parties in Messages 2 then the adversary creates shadow copies of these nodes A′–E′ as shown in Fig. 1, and has
to generate corresponding nonces {N ′′A ,N ′′B ,N ′′C ,N ′′D,N ′′E } for their Messages 2. It seeks to choose these values so
that
shorthash(N ′A,N ′B,N ′C ,N ′′D,N ′′E) = shorthash(N ′′A ,N ′′B ,N ′′C ,N ′D,N ′E)
This can be done by picking the nonces N ′′A ,N ′′B ,N ′′D randomly and then, based on the birthday paradox, the
intruder can search for values of N ′′C and N ′′E such that the hashes come out to be equal to each other. This
search, shown in the ﬁgure, can be expected to take time proportional to
√
H , whereH is the number of different
short hash values.
If we are to attain our goal of optimising the amount of security obtained from a given amount of empirical
communication (essentially hash width) we need to eliminate not only birthday attacks like this one but also
3 This explicitly means that each INFOB contains information that may indicate that B is likely to be associated with an empirical node
, or may indicate that it cannot be  if  is trustworthy. For example: if INFOB says that its empirical user is Bill, then it is likely but not
certain it is the Bill we want to connect to, but if the person we want to connect to is called Long, then we know that B does not belong to
Long.
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D
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Search for pair of equal short hashes
A
B
C Intruder
B’
E’
C’
D’
1234
1010
1006
3891
8367
1222
5783
0193
5729
8530
3485
1010
3000
7658
.... ....
1010  5
A’
Fig. 1. Birthday attack on a short hash, where the continuous and dashed lines indicate theDolev–Yao and empirical channels, respectively.
ones in which the intruder is able to achieve something if a basic combinatorial search for a value v such that
hash(v) = x succeeds, where x is ﬁxed. Normally, where cryptographic hashes are used, we choose them long
enough so that this type of attack is pointless (the property of collision resistance); we are going to have to devise
protocols that offer the adversary no opportunity to carry out searches of the types discussed above.
This example also illustrates that in creating and analysing protocols that deliver strong security for a min-
imum of empirical communication, we will need to go beyond the style familiar from the Dolev–Yao model
where all answers tend to be clear “secure” or “insecure”, but is likely to lead to subtle quantitative reasoning.
2.2. Other peer-to-peer key exchange protocols
In [2,32], Balfanz, Pasini and Vaudenay proposed two protocols for key exchange. Both of the schemes,
however, require a large number of bits to be communicated over the authenticated channel and to be com-
pared manually by using human effort. Taking a further step, in [21,22,37,8], Hoepman, Vaudenay, and Cˇagalj
proposed protocols that can get around the problem of the bandwidth of the authentic channel. They all share
many similarities: for example, all of them concentrate on the case where there are two parties in a peer-to-peer
network. In addition, they contain the idea of pre-committing two parties to some random secrets by sending
the corresponding cryptographic hash, in [21,22], or the output of the commitment scheme, in [37,8], to each
other at the start of the protocol.
In [21,22], Hoepman required each party to compute and manually compare two short authenticated strings
that are transmitted over the empirical channel:
Hoepman pairwise two-way authentication protocol
1. A −→N B : longhash(gxA)
1′. B −→N A : longhash(gxB)
Where xY is randomly picked by Y
2. A −→E B : shorthash(gxA)
2′. B −→E A : shorthash(gxB)
3. A −→N B : gxA
3′. B −→N A : gxB
A and B recompute to verify the long and short hashes.
A and B then share the key k = gxAxB
This is not optimal in the amount of work required by the humans implementing the empirical channel, since
the same amount of security (i.e., improbability of a successful attack) can be obtained in several ways by them
comparing a single string of the same length. We will give two methods for doing this later; a further one has
been devised by Vaudenay [37], and adapted by Cˇagalj et al. [8]. Vaudenay and Cˇagalj require a commitment
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scheme4 that is at least as secure as a standard cryptographic hash function.5 By this we mean that it must
be computationally infeasible to ﬁnd, with greater than inﬁnitesimal probability, collisions, or inverses to the
“commit” values. It should therefore be assumed that these values are as hard to compute as, and have as many
bits as, a strong cryptographic hash.
Vaudenay, in commonwith several other authors in this area, writes the juxtaposition of two pieces x and y of
data as x ‖ y: therefore we use this notation when discussing their protocols. We do not use this notation in our
own protocols because of the potential for confusing this notation with its common use as a parallel operator.
Vaudenay pairwise one-way authentication protocol
1. A −→N B : INFOA, c
Where c ‖ d = commit(INFOA,RA),
RA is a short random nonce of A.
2. B −→N A : RB
3. A −→N B : d
B computes RA = open(INFOA, c, d)
4. A −→E B : RA ⊕ RB
B veriﬁes the correctness of RA ⊕ RB
Note that the ﬁnal value compared in this protocol is the XOR of the short entropies devised by A and B. In
particular it does not depend functionally on the information INFOA being sent; in other words it does not follow
our principle P1. The guarantee of authenticity of INFOA that this protocol delivers is as a consequence of:
• The fact that this exchange guarantees the value for RA that B has discovered from the commit scheme is the
one that A intended.
• The way the commit scheme has strongly bound INFOA to RA at a point where RA is itself unknown to any
attacker.
Wewill see in Section 6 that this indirect binding of INFOA to the ﬁnal agreementmakes this protocol relatively
expensive relative to others we will introduce.
In this paper, we shall extend the idea of [12,13,14,15] in constructing an arbitrary-sized secure network,
but without the trustworthiness of the entire network. We also believe that the degree of security obtained is
essentially optimal for the amount of empirical (human) communication required.
In the mean time, we also try to reduce disadvantages of [21,22,37,8] with respect to efﬁciency when it comes
to implementing the commitment scheme and computing the long and short hashes, or digests.
3. Some protocols for bootstrapping groups
We will introduce our protocols in order they were discovered. The ones presented in this section are based
on one discovered by Roscoe in June 2005.6
All the protocols we propose in this paper use the principle P1 to bind (A, INFOA) to empirical identities.
It follows that, to achieve this, all we have to do is to avoid hash or digest anomalies. Our reasoning about
these protocols below is mainly conﬁned to this as Theorem 1 then establishes the main property we want. In
particular, as stated earlier, this means we do not need to reason about the relationship between empirical and
4 The commitment scheme used in this protocol consists of two functions. c ‖ d = commit(RA, INFOA) and INFOA ‖ RA = open(c ‖ d).
The combination of two pieces of data will frequently be written x ‖ y , this will be synonymous with the ordered pair (x, y). RA is a short
random nonce generated secretly by party A. A intends to bind RA and INFOA together without revealing RA by publishing the commitment
c. Eventually sending d (the decommitment) reveals RA, and binds this value ﬁrmly to INFOA in the eyes of the receiver. As RA is a short
random nonce, the party A needs to extend RA by adding extra random bits so that the security of the scheme in term of both binding and
hiding is equivalent to a standard cryptographic hash function.
5 We note that there is a lack of explicitness in the speciﬁcation of the commitment scheme in [37], since the security speciﬁcation
there fails to bind it to the Message m, as was obviously intended. The deﬁnition there is satisﬁed by commit(m, r) = Hash(N , r) = c, and
open(m, c) = (N , r), for N a fresh nonce.
6 In the notation of this section, that was HCBK3.
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logical nodes, though of course the (A, INFOA) have to contain sufﬁcient information to allow the mechanisms
assumed by Theorem 1 to occur.
There is a slightly grey area for protocols building groups of more than 2: should we or should we not be
content if the presence of a corrupt party in a groupmeans that communications that result between trustworthy
members of the group are themselves compromised? In some of the circumstances where we may wish to use ad
hoc group formation protocols it would be much better if the protocols were tolerant of corrupt members. We
will therefore be careful about our assumptions on this front.
It is obvious that any protocol which creates a shared secret is at least partially compromised by the presence
of a corrupt participant. However protocols which merely authenticate public-key-like information to nodes
are not globally compromised in the same way: they could be said to be establishing a local PKI.
In this section we will assume that there is one participant I in the protocol whom all agree is trustworthy.
This could be because all participants are known to be trustworthy, because I has some special status amongst
them, or because I is the only one requiring authentication. I will be called the “initiator”, and the other nodes
will be termed “slaves”. We will ﬁrst give a protocol that is designed for the case where there are empirical
channels both from all nodes to I and from I to all nodes. (It will be obvious that in some aspects the protocol
might work more naturally if there were empirical channels between all nodes.)
A crucial component of this and subsequent protocols is a digest function that takes two arguments:
digest(k ,M). The ﬁrst is a key that we will try to ensure varies randomly over a large space. The second is
the data that is being “digested”, typically the aggregate of all the information that is published by the nodes
in the protocol, as suggested by Theorem 1. The width of the digest b (i.e., the number of bits it produces) will
always be the number we want to communicate along the empirical channel. Therefore we will seek to minimise
b subject to obtaining a given measure of security. Of course, avoiding hash/digest anomalies will always be
something that we can only do up to a certain probability, since a pure guess will have a 1 in H chance, where
H = 2b. What we want to do is to ensure that as the key k varies:
(1) digest(k ,M) is uniformly distributed for any ﬁxed M .
(2) And for any ﬁxed  and M /= M ′:
Pr
(
digest(k ,M) = digest(k ⊕ ,M ′))  1
2b
The rationale for these two speciﬁcations will become apparent when we analyse the protocols we introduce
below.
We will assume for the time being that we have a digest function meeting this speciﬁcation, or at least one
that meets it up to some notion of cryptographic certainty. We will show how to implement such a function in
Section 5.
We now describe our ﬁrst protocol that avoids hash/digest anomalies. In the following S represents a typical
slave node, A a typical node (either I or S), longhash is a strongly collision-resistant and inversion-resistant hash
function and digest is a digest function as described above. init(I ,A) is true if I = A and false otherwise.
Hash Commitment Before Knowledge, HCBK protocol
0. I −→N ∀S : I
1. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : (A, INFOA)
2a. I −→N ∀S : longhash(kI )
2b. ∀S −→E I : committed
3. I −→N ∀S : kI
4a. ∀A displays : digest(kI , INFOS), init(I ,A)
4b. ∀A −→E ∀A′ : Users compare and check presence of I
The meanings of these messages are as follows:
• Message 1 publishes the information that all the nodes want to have attached to them, via the insecure
channel. Therefore they do not know upon receiving it that it is accurate.
• Message 2a has I devise a key kI with sufﬁcient entropy that longhash(kI ), which it publishes here, has no
more than an inﬁnitesimal likelihood of any combinatorial attack on it succeeding.
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• Message 2b has all the slaves communicate to I over the empirical channel7 that they have receivedMessage
2a and are therefore committed to their ﬁnal digest value (though none of them know it yet).
• Message 3 has I publish the key kI after it has received commitments from all members of the group over the
empirical channels. All slaves now have the duty to check if the values of Messages 2a and 3 are consistent.
• Message 4a has all the nodes compute what should be the same digest value.
• Message 4b has them compare these values: this could be done either through the single point of contact at I
or more generally. Once a node knows that all have agreed this value it has completed the protocol and can
enter group mode. It also guarantees that one of the nodes doing the agreeing has been playing the initiator
role.
3.1. HCBK protocol analysis
Thanks to Theorem 1, all we have to show is that our protocol prevents hash/digest anomalies.
(1) Digest anomalies are not impossible, since the intruder can partition G into two parts, and feed both of
them different sets of values. It would then act as an empirically silent “initiator” in one of these subgroups.
Picking a random value for the key will give the intruder atmost a 2−b chance of the two digest values
agreeing, thanks to the speciﬁcation of the digest function. Our hope is that it is impossible for an attacker
to have a better chance than this. To demonstrate this we analyse the positions the various nodes are in
when they ﬁrst become committed to their ﬁnal digest value.
(2) I is committed when, following its acceptance of Messages 1, it creates the key kI . A slave S is effectively
committed once it has accepted Message 2a, even though at that stage it cannot know what the digest
value is. For it has all information other than kI , and it has longhash(kI ), meaning that there is no better
than an inﬁnitesimal chance that it will accept a different k ′I in Message 3.
Thanks to the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition of a digest function, no party other than the initiator can know
the ﬁnal digest value it will use with any certainty at all: as far as they are concerned this value is still drawn
from a uniform distribution over all digest values.
(3) So let us examine the state the network is in just before I publishes kI in Message 3. The trustworthy
node I is the only one that actually knows enough to compute the ﬁnal digest—in particular no intruder
can know the digest value dI that I will compute in Message 4a. Furthermore, I knows—and therefore we
know—that each slave S has been committed to some ﬁnal digest value dS . Some or all of the dS may be
different from dI , and even equal ones may be based on different antecedents. But since all of the slave
nodes S know the second argument INFOSS to their use of digest before the intruder knows kI , it follows
from the speciﬁcation above that, unless INFOSS = INFOSI , the probability that dI = dS is 2−b.
(4) It follows that if, inMessage 4, the various nodes go on to compare precisely these values and two of them
have different values for INFOS , no matter what the intruder might have done, it will give him no better
than the 2−b chance that we have aimed for of them digesting to the same value.
(5) There is still one potential avenue of attack open: can the intruder change the mind of one or more
participants about the ﬁnal digest value so that it equals the others? The only way it could do this would
be to make them abandon this run and bring them to the point in a subsequent run where they are ready
to agree the ﬁnal digest.
This would be impossible with the initiator. I is the ﬁnal determiner of its own digest value by constructing
kI . So re-starting it would not give greater than 2−b chance of achieving any particular value. Also, and
conclusively, the initiator expects to get empirical signals in Message 2b from the slaves, and these would
not be available from the slaves.
7 The commitments must be transmitted over the unforgeable empirical channel because if it were not the case then the intruders could
stand in the middle of the network to block all Messages 1 and 2 sent between the initiator and the slaves, and to fake the commitment
signals from these slaves to the initiator. Once I hears the faked commitment signals, it then reveals the secret hash key kI to the adversary,
who now can start another run with all the slaves, the adversary will play the role of the initiator in the second run, but because it knows the
hash key, and therefore it can constructively manipulate the information in Messages 1 and 2 for his own purposes such that the ﬁnal digest
values of both the slaves in the second run and the real initiator in the ﬁrst run come out to be the same, even though they have different
antecedents. This attack is similar to the one described in details in Appendix.
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On the other hand, if a slave S could be re-started after dI was known, then the intruder could perform a
combinatorial search for a value k ′I which would yield the digest value dI (with the combination of INFO′A
of which he wants to persuade S), then a potential attack is open provided the second empiricalMessage 2b
from S to I can be blocked. This would lead to an attack.8 We therefore make the following speciﬁcation
for the implementation of the protocol:
The implementation must be designed so that agreement is impossible between ﬁnal digest values
other than those whose commitment has been signalled by the Messages 2b that I received.
The most obvious way of achieving this is via timing limits: an upper bound on the time between I
sending Message 3 and agreeing Message 4, and a lower bound between I receiving a Message 2b from
S and S sending another Message 2b. One could also use run numbers that are included in empirical
communications, but of course that would add to the empirical effort.
On the assumption that the above is achieved, we conclude that the nodes will never seek to agree ﬁnal
digest values to which they were committed later than the issue of Message 3 by I . Therefore our protocol
achieves its goal of limiting the chance of a successful attack to at most 2−b.
3.2. Modiﬁed versions of HCBK
We will call the above protocol HCBK1, standing for Hash Commitment Before Knowledge, the principle
on which it works. Recall its goal: to agree a set of information of the form {(A, INFOA) | A ∈ G } amongst
the members of G, and hence authenticate each such INFOA belonging to a trustworthy A to the node that is
declaring it.
If the nodes are programmed to allow any size of group, there is nothing to stop a node controlled by the
intruder joining into HCBK1. The result would be that the members of G have some INFO for nodes that are
outside the group deﬁned by the empirical channels. This is ﬁne provided they do not assume that all the nodes
that have participated in the run are in the intended group, or a check is performed after the run.
An alternative, which only makes sense if all the nodes in the group are assumed to be trustworthy, is for each
node to check that the number of participants corresponds to the expected number. Since each one is present,
it then follows no-one else is. We will call this protocol HCBK2.
If each INFOA contains a way of sending A data privately, say a public key (which needs not be certiﬁcated
or long term) or a Difﬁe–Hellman token, then we could replace the broadcast Message 3 by some means of
propagating kI securely. This could take the form of a separate message from I to each S , or some tree of
propagation amongst the S rooted at I . Upon successful completion of the protocol the group would then have
a shared secret, namely kI . Since it is vital that a shared secret is not shared with untrustworthy nodes, variants of
this form are only useful on the assumptions that (a) all members of G are trustworthy and (b) that the number
of participants is checked as in HCBK2. Clearly this represents a class of potential variant protocols, but we
name them all under the heading of HCBK3.
This protocol works because, following its successful completion, we know (with likelihood 1 − 2−b) that kI
has only been sent to trustworthy participants, namely it really is a secret unknown outside the group G.
Recall that these protocols depend crucially on the initiator I being trustworthy: a corrupt initiator could
use a birthday attack essentially like the one we described earlier.
One situationwhere this is deﬁnitely not an issue is when the slave devices themselves have no need of security,
as when the user of the initiator is seeking to connect his or her laptop to a number of wireless peripheral devices.
That personmust be sure that the connection is precisely to those devices that are trusted because of their context,
labelling, etc. In that case there is no need for empirical channels from the initiator to the slave devices. All we
require is that these devices can signal the initiator (probably via some display that the initiator’s user can see)
to convey Message 2b and the digest value from Message 4.
This would work for all three of the variants described above: HCBK1, 2 and 3. We will call the resulting,
simpliﬁedprotocolsAHCBK1, 2and3, on thegrounds that theyaredeﬁnitelyasymmetric. (Theoriginal protocols
8 For details of the attack, please see Appendix.
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are neither properly symmetric, thanks to the role of the initiator, nor asymmetric, since their overall goals are
symmetric.)
4. Symmetrised group protocol
The main protocol we present in this section was devised by the authors in February 2006.
The protocols in the previous section all rely crucially upon I being trustworthy: what are we to do if there is
no node that is uniformly trusted or it is hard to select one, but we still want a local PKIwhich authenticates the
INFOAs of all trustworthy nodes? What we would like to achieve instead, is that a successful run of the protocol
correctly authenticates all the trustworthy parties to each other irrespective of what the others may have done.
In order to do this we identify the following second principle, derived from the design of HCBK1:
P2 Anode A is safe from effectivemanipulations of its ﬁnal hash or digest d to equal others in a hash anomaly
provided that there is a point at which the following things are both true.
(a) A is committed to its ﬁnal value d = digest(k∗, INFOS), though it may not yet know it.
(b) There is a value kA which A knows, randomising the calculation of k∗, which (i) no other party can
know and (ii) no other party can have used in the protocol in a way that has inﬂuenced A’s ﬁnal
digest d .
Note that this is true of the initiator I and the value kI in HCBK1 at the point where I has just sent Message
2a. In that protocol I is completely committed to its digest at the point longhash(kI ) is revealed, so no other
node can have used longhash(kI ) in a message; the purpose of clause (ii) above will become apparent later when
more than one node is responsible for the value of the digest key.
Before we can establish anything formally, we need to be precise about the idea used above that kA randomises
the calculation of k∗. We will assume that A calculates k∗ by some formula from kA and perhaps some values
communicated to it by other nodes in the protocol—necessarily values it is committed to at the point discussed in
P2. Thanks to assumption (b)(ii) we know all those values are independent of kA. What wemean by “randomises
k∗” is that if kA varies uniformly and randomly across its range then k∗ also varies uniformly and randomly
across its own, for other values being ﬁxed.
The most straightforward way of achieving randomisation is for A to calculate k∗ as the XOR of the set of
kA’s it wants to construct it from.
The fact that this deﬁnition is symmetric is an advantage in group protocols because it does not matter what
order each node records the same group in. From here on we will assume that this XOR method is used, and in
fact we have already taken account of this in the deﬁnition of a digest function: it lies behind the “⊕ ” in the
second part.
In HCBK, P2 applies to the initiator relative to kI , which is the only contributor to the ﬁnal digest key. That
protocol relies on much more subtle reasoning in respect of the slave nodes, as shown by our reasoning in the
previous section and the principle of Messages 2 and 4 being aligned that we had to adopt. If the slave nodes
had been able to follow P2, there would have been no need for this.
Our second sort of protocol is designed so that all nodes can rely independently on P2. Therefore each node
will now need some value made up specially for this purpose, which is fresh and unpredictable. Let us call this
value kA. The protocol is now:
Symmetrised HCBK protocol
1. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : A, INFOA, longhash(A, kA)
2. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : kA
3. ∀A −→E ∀A′ : users compare digest(k∗, INFOS)
where k∗ is the XOR of all the kA’s for A ∈ G
The following notes explain these messages.
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• Message 1: introduces the information, INFOA, each party A wants to authenticate and a long hash of its key
kA. The identity A is included in this longhash to ensure that the intruder posing as C /= A cannot simply copy
A’s key kA by copying its longhash value to negate A’s randomising effect on k∗, which leads to a reﬂection
attack.9 After this message each node should have all the information it requires about the other nodes
except for the values kA, and furthermore should be committed to each of these values in the sense that when
told the kA’s it will be able to check each one.
At the point when the sending and receiving of this message is complete, it follows that every node A is
committed to some ﬁnal digest value dA, knows one of the antecedents (kA) of this ﬁnal digest that no-one
else does. It is certain at this point that no party other than A can know the ﬁnal digest—and very likely that
A doesn’t know it either. The distinction between being committed to a value and knowing it is immensely
important. From this we know that P2 applies.
• Message boundary: there has to be somemoment atwhich anodedecides it has ﬁnished inputting newMessage
1’s. This might be determined by some timeout, or some message sent from one of the nodes (empirically
or over the general network). It is clearly in nodes’ interest that they all make correct decisions on this, for
otherwise they will not agree. One can imagine them attempting to synchronise by agreeing on a hash of the
Message 1’s they know about over the Dolev–Yao channel: that might well serve a useful purpose since it
would guard against involving humans in empirical communication when there is no point.
Whatever mechanism they choose does not matter provided it does not involve them revealing the keys kX ’s
to each other. For it is absolutely vital that none of them accepts any further Message 1 after its own key kX
is revealed.
• Message 2: each node broadcasts its unguessable key to all other nodes once it is committed to its ﬁnal digest
value. Having received all these keys, each node can check the correctness of all the long hashes received
from Messages 1. If there is any thing unmatched regarding the long hash values, the node will abort and
presumably tell the rest of the group that this has happened.
Essentially these broadcasts expand the longhashes of the Messages 1 into something the nodes can under-
stand.
• Message 3: has the members of G display and compare the value of digests through the empirical channel.
Notice that, like both the previous protocols we have considered, this digest follows P1 and includes the
whole data of the protocol.
4.1. Protocol analysis
We shall call this the SHCBK protocol, for Symmetrised Hash Commitment Before Knowledge. The ﬁnal
result is that the members of G are authenticated to each other as the owner of the information they have
introduced. The fact that SHCBK achieves its goal of authenticating the (A, INFOA)s is a consequence of this
following result.
Theorem 2. Suppose a protocol calls for the agreement on the digest value d = digest(k∗, INFOS). Suppose further
that the trustworthy node Amakes a contribution kA towards its own calculation of k∗A via XOR, and that each other
trustworthy node B calculates its k∗B as a similar XOR.
Then if P2 applies to A and the value k∗A then the likelihood that digest(k∗A, INFOSA) = digest(k∗B, INFOSB), for a
second trustworthy node B for which (k∗A, INFOSA) /= (k∗B, INFOSB) is smaller than or equal to 2−b.
9 We could build a check into our protocol by saying that no node A accepts its own value of longhash(kA) from another user, however,
putting the name in makes it clearer. The same reﬂection attack was also reported in the papers of Cˇagalj et al. [8], and that is why their
pairwise protocol concatenates a single bit (0 and 1) in front of each INFO. The same thing is done with the two-way authentication scheme
of Vaudenay [37], but he did not make it clear why. Fortunately, the reﬂection attack does not work against HCBK as there is only a single
cryptographic hash generated by the initiator, longhash(kI ).
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Proof. As we have argued above, whatever other (dishonest) nodes pick for their kC ’s, these values cannot
be related to either k∗A or k∗B, thanks to the use of XOR and the identities included in longhash(A, kA) and
longhash(B, kB) in Messages 1 that avoid a reﬂexive attack.10 As a result, the actual values of both k∗A and k∗B are
uniform random variables whose values no node knew at the point where they agreed to ﬁnish inputting the
ﬁrst messages.
Clearly the intruder cannot prevent A having kA in its XOR, nor can it prevent B from having kB. It can, if it
chooses prevent one or other of A and B having the other’s key in the set it XORs. It is easy to see that unless
it allows them each to have the other’s key the values k∗A and k∗B are themselves independent uniform random
variables as kA and kB vary. In this case, by the ﬁrst part of the speciﬁcation of a digest function, the digest values
digest(k∗A, INFOSA) and digest(k∗B, INFOSB) are independent with the probability of 2−b of being equal whether
INFOSA and INFOSB are equal or not.
So we can concentrate on the case where each gets to see the other’s key. In that case, there is no need for the
intruder to allow A and B to see the same set of other kC ’s. If all other nodes are under the control of the intruder,
we will have k∗A = kA ⊕ kB ⊕  and k∗B = kA ⊕ kB ⊕  for values  and  controlled by the intruder. So there
will be a value  =  ⊕  , independent of kA and kB and possibly picked by the intruder such that k∗A = k∗B ⊕ 
as these values vary randomly.
The probability that digest(k∗A, INFOSA) = digest(k∗B, INFOSB) when INFOSA /= INFOSB is then smaller than
or equal to 2−b by the second part of the digest speciﬁcation, presented in Section 3. 
Note that this result, coupledwithTheorem 1, establishes thatB should be in a position to associate (A, INFOA),
with the empirical identity that ownsA, conﬁdently, even if nodes other than the two of them are not trustworthy.
Thus SHCBK does indeed authenticate the INFOA’s of trustworthy nodes to each other even if corrupt nodes
are in G.
It is important to note that our protocols do not supply evidence that nodes are trustworthy: mutual trust has
to be brought into the protocol from outside, or possibly be established subsequent to the protocol run based
on nodes’ later communications.
Calling the basic protocol SHCBK1, it can be extended by a count of nodes to create SHCBK2 for the
case where all nodes are assumed to be trustworthy. Asymmetric versions are also possible; they use more
computational effort than the asymmetric versions of HCBK, but avoid the commit signals required there.
5. Digest functions
The speciﬁcation of the digest function given in Section 3 has similarities to universal hash functions originally
proposed by Carter andWegman in [11,38] although our speciﬁcation is more restrictive because of the presence
of  (the two deﬁnitions are the same if  is ﬁxed to 0).11 However, there does not seem to have been much
work on the short-output universal hash functions and trying to exploit short outputs to decrease the amount
of computation compared to calculating long-output hashes. Most work on cryptographic hash functions
concentrates on ones that are collision- and inversion-resistant: these properties are not required of our digest
functions, which is just as well since the low number of output bits render them unachievable.
What we are going to do in this section is to give a very brief analysis of what has been done in the literature
in constructing functions with similar purposes. We then move on to propose our own ideal digest framework,
and develop ideas for efﬁciently implementing it in both hardware and software using pseudo-random number
generation (PRNG).
10 In fact, of course, the intruder can use any function derived from A’s or B’s own longhash, as a kC , but since it has no way of relating
these longhashes back to kA and kB , such values are no better than independent for cryptographic purposes.
11 Our style of use of digest functions is very different from that of [38,36] since our keys vary dynamically and randomly at run time,
whereas in the calculation of message authentication codes (MACs) they are ﬁxed for all time. As has been demonstrated in the proof of
Theorem 2, the way in which our keys are agreed between nodes at run time can be manipulated by an attacker in a way that means that
different nodes’ keys may be relatively shifted by a  known to the attacker. The inclusion of the  shift in our deﬁnition of a digest is to
ensure that this type of activity can never beneﬁt the intruder.
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5.1. Background information
There are some important points we wish to make about the computation of the digest values. In order to
make things simple and secure, the parties need to sort all of the pairs {A, INFOA} in alphabetic order say, before
they concatenate all of them into INFOS . It is also normal to require that all the names A and public keys (if in
INFOA) are distinct.
Our second comment relates to the randomising effects of the digests. It would be a great mistake to compute
digest(k∗, INFOS) as some function of k∗ and some similar length digest′(INFOS), which it might be tempting to
do. This is because an intruder could then—during the exchanges of Message 1—manipulate the sets INFOSA
heard by the different nodesA provided theywill all compute the same digest′(INFOSA). The fact that the intruder
cannot predict at this stage what the ﬁnal digests will be (not knowing k∗) would be irrelevant, since it would
know they will all calculate the same value. As a result, what we need to compute is the keyed digest of INFOS
with respect to key, k∗, with k∗ fundamentally embedded in the calculation.
With this in mind, a number of different schemes for computing the digest values have been proposed by
Pasini, Vaudenay, Gehrmann and others in [31,16,7]. Pasini, Vaudenay, Gehrmann in [31,16] as well as the
Bluetooth white-paper [7] suggested the following scheme:
digest(k∗, INFOS) = truncb
(
hash(k∗ ‖ INFOS))
where hash is a cryptographic hash function such as SHA, TIGER or a block cipher such as DES. The truncb()
function truncates to the leading b bits. We make two observations about this. The ﬁrst is that the deﬁnition of
an inversion- and collision-free hash function does not normally specify the distribution of individual groups
of bits: if h(x) is such a function then so is h′(x) = 〈1〉b·h(x), which would clearly be useless in their protocol as
∀x and ∀k∗ we have:
digest(k∗, x) = trunc(h′(k∗ ‖ x)) = trunc(〈1〉b·h(k∗ ‖ x)) = 〈1〉b
It follows that the standard speciﬁcation of a hash function is useless in establishing that the above function
comes close to our speciﬁcation: a speciﬁc analysis would be required for any particular function proposed. The
second observation is that computing a longhash that operates on long words is certainly expensive and does
not exploit the short bit-length output of the digest function. We will discuss the relative complexity of hashing
and digests in Section 6.
Taking a different approach, Gehrmann and Nyberg in [17] proposed using an error-correcting code such as
the Reed-Solomon code to construct the digest function. This has the advantage of having a coherent mathe-
matical structure but on the other hand the algorithm limits the bit-length of the input message to some ﬁxed
number such as 128 or 256. As a consequence, to digest any signiﬁcant amount of data, the algorithm must
ﬁrstly compress the input message into that number of bits by using a cryptographic hash which is inefﬁcient
as discussed above. This feature also makes the scheme be potentially vulnerable to attacks should the intruder
ﬁnd (off line) a collision on the cryptographic hash. The reason for this weakness is that the input message is
not entirely linked to the key in computation as discussed in the second paragraph of this section.
In summary, both these approaches rely on applying a standard hash function to an object at least as large
as INFOS , something which is much less efﬁcient than necessary. Their disadvantage will grow as the size of the
group (and hence the size of INFOS) increases, and this will be discussed in Section 6.
5.2. Matrix product construction of a digest function
Let us recall the formal speciﬁcation of the digest function: as we vary the key k∗, we always have:
(1) digest(k∗,M) is uniformly distributed for any ﬁxed M .
(2) And for any ﬁxed  and M /= M ′:
Pr(digest(k∗,M) = digest(k∗ ⊕ ,M ′))  1
2b
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In order to satisfy the above speciﬁcation, we need to have the probability of digest(k∗,M)[i] = digest(k∗ ⊕
,M ′)[i] be smaller than or equal to 12 for i = 1, . . . , b when M /= M ′, and that the probabilities for different i
are independent.12 This means that a change in any non-zero number of bits ofM must have a distinct random
effect on every bit of the output.13
Suppose we want to construct a b-bit digest of a (K − 1)-bit Message M . The ﬁrst thing we do is to pad M
with an extra 1-bit at the end, so its length becomes K withMk = 1. We can build an idealised digest function as
follows. Let us consider the following idealised framework: for i = 1, . . . , b and j = 1, . . . ,K , suppose that Ri,j
are independent uniform boolean-valued random variables (UBRV’s) based on k∗.14 Using matrix product, we
deﬁne:
digest(k∗,M) = M  R
where the symbol  represents the binary product of the vectorM and the matrix R. This is, of course, the same
as the b inner products of M and the columns of R. This is equivalent to deﬁning
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , b} : di =
K⊕
j=1
(Ri,j ∧Mj)
and
digest(k∗,M) = [d1, . . . , db]
where Mj is the jth bit of the input M .
Theorem 3. The deﬁnition above satisﬁes the speciﬁcation of a digest function provided that the Ri,j are derived
from k∗ linearly (i.e., Ri,j(k∗1 ⊕ k∗2 ) = Ri,j(k∗1 )⊕ Ri,j(k∗2 )).
Proof. This proof relies heavily on the standard fact that if U and V are any independent boolean random
variable, and U is a UBRV, then U ⊕ V is also a UBRV.
The ﬁrst use of this principle comes in the proof that digest(k∗,M) is uniformly distributed. We know by
construction that all the bits of this digest are independent (since the sets of the Ri,j they are based on are
disjoint). It follows that digest(k∗,M) is uniformly distributed if all its bits di are. That in turn follows because
di = Ri,K ⊕ X , where the ﬁrst term comes because we have assumedMK = 1 and the second comes from the rest
of the terms of the inner product creating di . Since Ri,K is clearly independent of X and is UBRV, it follows that
di is UBRV.
So suppose we have ﬁxedM /= M ′ and . To prove the second part of the speciﬁcation we need to show that
the probability that digest(k∗,M) = digest(k∗ ⊕ ,M ′) is 2−b. The left- and right-hand sides of this equation are
dA and dB, respectively, and let the Ri,j derived from these two keys be, RAi,j and R
B
i,j .
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , b}, we then have:
dAi =
K⊕
j=1
(RAi,j ∧Mj)
12 digest(k∗,M)[i] denotes the ith bit of the digest value digest(k∗,M).
13 This requirement is similar to the strict avalanche criterion [1], used in the design of S-Box of DES [39] and customised hash functions
such as SHA or TIGER that guarantees any single or multiple changes in input bits have a random effect on every output bit.
14 For them to be truly independent k∗ would have to have far more bits than it actually does. That is why we call this the idealised digest.
In the ideal model we will, for simplicity, identify the Ri,j with distinct bits determined by i and j of the corresponding k∗ . In practice we
should aim to have them only subtly dependent, and in ways that are impossible to predict without knowledge of k∗ . We will discuss this
issue later.
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dBi =
K⊕
j=1
(RBi,j ∧M ′j)
We can see that the ith bit, ti , of digest(k∗A,M)⊕ digest(k∗B,M ′) is equal to:
ti =
(
digest(k∗A,M)⊕ digest(k∗B,M ′)
) [i]
= dAi ⊕ dBi
=
⎛
⎝ K⊕
j=1
(RAi,j ∧Mj)
⎞
⎠⊕
⎛
⎝ K⊕
j=1
(RBi,j ∧M ′j)
⎞
⎠
=
K⊕
j=1
(
(RAi,j ∧Mj)⊕ (RBi,j ∧M ′j)
)
=
⊕
{j∈{1..K}|Mj∧M ′j}
(RAi,j ⊕ RBi,j)
⊕
⊕
{j∈{1..K}|Mj∧¬M ′j}
RAi,j
⊕
⊕
{j∈{1..K}|¬Mj∧M ′j}
RBi,j
It quickly follows from k∗A = k∗B ⊕  and the linearity of the derivation of the Ri,j that any failure of indepen-
dence between RAi,j and R
B
k ,l can only happen when i = k and j = l.15 This means that the three random variables
from which ti is formed above are independent. Our assumption that M /= M ′ means that the sets over which
the last two are “summed” cannot both be empty. Whichever one is nonempty must (as the ⊕ of independent
UBRVs) itself be a UBRV.
Since the ti’s are themselves independent in our ideal model, it follows that the probability that the two digests
are equal is precisely smaller than or equal to 2−b. 
It was stated in [29,20,28] that the completely random matrix R could be replaced by a Toeplitz matrix—
one with constant diagonal thanks to the relation Ri,j = Ri+1,j+1—where the same calculation was used to
create a universal hash function, decreasing the required number of random bits from K × b to only K + b− 1.
The same is true for digest functions and we will present the relatively complex proof of this in a subsequent
paper.
This suggests that, in order to get a good digest, we need to get close to this ideal model with either a
completely random matrix or a Toeplitz one. The most obvious way to do this is to use the k∗ value to seed a
suitable pseudo-randomnumber generator (PRNG) as has been suggested byKrawczyk in [24,25] but otherwise
follow the idealmodel. Since the problemof decidingwhether a typical stream is truly randomor pseudo random
has beenwell studied, for example there are a number tests for randomness thatmust be satisﬁed by any standard
pseudo random number generation [19,26,18], it follows that if we use a good PRNG (one known to satisfy these
tests) with a seed which is of the size of a typical cryptographic random number (say 160 or 200 bits), then for
cryptographic purposes it should be essentially as good as the ideal model. In the following sections we will see
two approaches to calculating the digest: the ﬁrst is a hardware implementation of exactly this idea; the second
15 In practice, if one wants to use a linear pseudo-random bit generator to derive Ri,j , then there will exist linear relations between any bit
and some (says r) of its preceding bits in the random output stream, for example: bn+r = f(bn . . . bn+r−1), where f() is a linear function.
However, it is possible tomake these relations highly unpredictable if wemake the linear function/structure of the randomnumber generator
depend on the value of the key or part of it which is unknown to the intruder and every one else at the point when INFOS is committed. So
what we might expect is as follows: bn+r = Fx(bn . . . bn+r−1), here x is derived directly from the key k∗ . And the effect of this as well as the
detailed construction will be analysed more extensively in a subsequent paper.
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Fig. 2. Hardware implementation of a digest function.
is an approximation to this using operations that can be executed efﬁciently using standard microprocessor
operations.
5.3. Hardware implementation
Suppose we are given input data INFOS with bit-length K . Suppose r = m ∗ b is some multiple of the desired
output length b. We ﬁrst need to generate (K/m)+ b pseudo-random numbers each of length r, seeded by k∗, in
a register R on designated clock cycles. One possibility, illustrated in Fig. 2, is to use one or more linear feedback
shift registers (LFSR) discussed in [24,25,19] to produce pseudo-random numbers, each seeded with the whole
of k∗ or some linear function of it. We then initialise a shift register S , and an accumulator register A, both with
length r to standard values, possibly 0. The random number generators are designed to produce r bits on each
cycle in a register R.
On each designated clock cycle, the register S is shifted by m bits, introducing the next m bits of INFOS or
some standard values, possibly 0, if INFOS is already complete. By this means the whole of INFOS will have
passed entirely though S after (K/m)+ b cycles. Also on each designated clock cycle, we enable the replacement
of the accumulator register A by the previous value bitwise-exclusive-or-ed with the bitwise-and of the registers
R and S .
A = A⊕ (R ∧ S)
After the (K/m)+ b cycles are completed, we partition the register A into b groups of m consecutive bits. The
bits of each of the said b groups are then exclusive-or-ed to a single bit. Finally, the juxtaposition of the said
b bits will form the digest value. That way each input bit has contributed once to each bit of the digest as in
the software implementation. In addition, the only operators we use here are Shifting, XOR and AND, so this
makes implementation done very fast in hardware.
The efﬁciency of the implementation can be improved if we switch to using a Toeplitz matrix of random
values rather than the completely random one discussed above, since this dramatically reduces the number of
pseudo-random bits required to be generated in the scheme.
If, as suggestedabove, the randombits are generatedbyLFSRs, then theoutputs generatedare linear functions
of k∗. This means that this type of pseudo-random number generator, as well being very well understood and
well behaved (see [19], for example), has the linearity property used in Theorem 3. We intend to discuss further
ideas for the creation of PRNGs in a sequel to this paper.
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5.4. Software implementation
The above calculation can, of course, be run in software as well as hardware. However, it would take many
clock cycles without the implementation of special operations. In this section we show that a good approxi-
mation can be calculated using standard integer multiplication for half or whole word blocks implemented in
most microprocessors rather than a customised hardware. Let us divide INFOS into b-bit blocks
[
m1, . . . ,mt=Kb
]
.
We then generate pseudo random b-bit blocks ri based on k∗.16 If we deﬁne
S =
t⊕
i=1
(mi × ri)
The integer multiplications mi × ri lead S to have 2b bits. We ﬁnally set
digest(k∗, INFOS) = S1 ⊕ S2
where S1 and S2 are two halves of S .
We note that multiplication together with XORing let every bit of the input inﬂuence every bit of the output
very much uniformly. Unfortunately, there may be some asymmetry due to the carry bits in multiplication.
Furthermore, in software implementation, only b random bits of ri inﬂuence how each bit of mi maps into the
16 bits of the digest output while the ideal model suggests there should be b2. In other word, the analogues of
the Rij from the ideal model we are using cannot be completely independent.
To increase this independencewe could additionally add one ormore terms of the form r′′i ∗ (r′i ∧ mi), where r′i
and r′′i are different series of pseudo-random numbers, to our accumulator. Increasing the amount of calculation
like this could move us closer to our idealised model, and the number of terms of the form r′′i ∗ (r′i ∧ mi) used
represents a trade-off between the efﬁciency and quality of the digest. Further work is required to decide if this
is worthwhile.17
6. Efﬁciency
It seems reasonable to measure the efﬁciency of protocols in this class in two ways: the amount of empirical,
or human, effort required to complete them; and the amount of processing required at the nodes.
6.1. Empirical work
The major item of work for the humans is probably the sending and receipt of the ﬁnal digest value, and the
effort required to check equality. In the case where a user can broadcast empirically to all other nodes (as with
a set of people in a room), the most efﬁcient way of performing this check is for one person to announce his/her
value d0 and the rest to check that their values all equal d0. Depending on circumstances they might then each
have to announce deﬁnite equality, or only announce inequality.
It seems clear, as argued in [37,34], that it is impossible to bound the intruder’s chance of success to 2−b by
comparing (explicitly or implicitly) less than b bits of information. Given pre-knowledge of the size of the group,
the size check in protocols labelled 2 and 3 is essentially free; it seems impossible to account for the difﬁculty of
performing it in other circumstances (though in the protocols with an initiator it simply means that the number
of Message 2b’s received by I corresponds with the number of nodes’ INFOs that are digested).
It therefore seems that all our protocols are essentially optimal in the amount of security they provide for
a given amount of human effort, except that in the non-symmetrised cases (HCBK) there is the work involved
in the sending and receipt of Message 2b, which is a constant and certainly less than the effort required for
Message 4. We will see shortly that this represents one side of an interesting trade-off.
16 Any high quality pseudo-random generator could be used here. Similar to the hardware implementation, we can use a linear feedback
shift register seeded with k∗, or several seeded with parts of k∗, this can be implemented extremely fast in either software or hardware.
17 We have recently discovered that this software model can, with a small modiﬁcation, satisfy the digest speciﬁcation to the same extent
as the Toeplitz adaptation of the ideal model. In this way only K + b− 1 (pseudo) random bits are required.
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6.2. Assumptions about processing cost
Let W and B be the number of words and, respectively, bits required to hold a long hash value: in [37],
Vaudenay suggests perhaps B =160 bits, so we assume W = 5. He also suggests that 15 or 16 bits are reasonable
choices for b, the width of the digest which is 1 word in this case, and we will adopt that too. We also assume that
nonces and other strong cryptographic values have the same length B. Aside from the protocols labelled 3, the
only processing effort required in implementing our protocols is the computation of long hashes and digests. In
order to assess the complexity of our protocols we have to have a model of the complexity of computing hashes
and digests. It is clear that the cost of computing the b-bit output hashb(INFOS) increases linearly with the length
of INFOS . It also seems clear that it will increase signiﬁcantly with b, and a simple model in which each word
of a running temporary value of length b is combined with each input word suggests our overall model might
be b× length(INFOS), as indeed does the idealised model presented in the previous section. Therefore we will
adopt that assumption in the following analysis. Since well-known hash algorithms tend to be ﬁxed width, and
vary signiﬁcantly in their individual costs, it is hard to be too deﬁnite about this rule. Our analysis of SHA-1
shows it to have a cost perhaps 5 times that of the digest algorithm we described above, based on the random
number generator quoted in the footnote earlier.
6.3. Processing cost of HCBK and SHCBK
It follows that the total processing cost of the non-symmetrised protocols labelled less than 3, with a group
of size N and where the word-length of all the INFOs is M , at every node is
W × W +M = 25 +M
This results from one longhash (both the input and output lengths are of W in words) and one digest (the input
length is M words and the b-bit output is 1 word) computed by each party.
In the symmetrised case there is more work to do since now each node has to check N − 1 long hashes and
create one.18 Therefore the above quantity increases to
N × W × W +M = 25N +M
This, of course, is the other side of the trade-off mentioned above.
6.4. Comparison with the processing cost of Vaudenay’s and Cˇagalj’s schemes
Vaudenay’s protocol [37], in its basic form, relates only to the transmission of a message from one party to
another. In order to compare it with ours we need either to restrict our protocols to this function or to expand
Vaudenay’s so that it achieves the broadcast of a message from each member of a group to each other. We can
do both of these things.
We will assume that the commit scheme, used in [37] to commit a message of length M and a nonce RA
of length b bits = 1 word, takes max(M ,W) words as input. Since the security of the scheme is equivalent to
a cryptographic hash, it seems to require randomisation that introduces additional nondeterminism to that
introduced by RA. This is equivalent to adding a hidden variable of length W − b. We will assume, for ease of
calculation, that M  W .
With W = 5 it follows that for transmission of a single message of size M this protocol requires, at each of
the two nodes,19 processing of order
18 In both our symmetrised scheme and the two-way authentication protocol of Vaudenay [37], the inputs of the longhash and the commit
scheme include an identity or a single bit to avoid a reﬂection attack. However, as both of them are very short, we ignore them in our
analysis.
19 It might be clearer to point out that W is also the word length of both the commitment c, and the decommitment d . In Vaudenay’s
scheme A has to compute the function commit(), whereas B computes open(). Both of the functions are equivalent in term of computation
cost.
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M × W = M × 5
Our symmetrised protocol does this in 25 +M .
We observe that both Vaudenay’s and Cˇagalj’s protocols can be extended to a group protocol that achieves
the same goal as our schemes: each node has to commit once and open (or decommit) N − 1 times, and no digest
is required. (The users will ﬁnally compare the XOR of one short random string per node.) IfM is the total size
of all the INFOs in our protocols, then the equivalent message that each party in Vaudenay’s or Cˇagalj’s group
version commits to will be of length MN . In order for the commit scheme to have an equal level of security as our
long hash, the lengths of both the random data of the input of the commit scheme and its output need to be W
as discussed above. As a result, the processing cost of each party in Vaudenay’s group version is approximately
N × W ×
(
M
N
)
= M × W = 5 ×M
As M is the concatenation of N pieces of public information INFOA, we have:
M = N × wordLength(INFOA)
So the difference between Vaudenay’s group protocol and SHCBK is:
5M − (25N +M) = 4 ×M − 25 × N
= 4 × N × wordLength(INFOA)− 25 × N
= 4 × N × (wordLength(INFOA)− 6.25)
As the word length of INFOA will be always much longer20 than 6.25 words that is equivalent to only 200 bits,
this will normally be signiﬁcantly more expensive than our protocols.
It seems clear that our protocols are the more efﬁcient in terms of computational power because we followed
P1: we have only had to bind the messages cryptographically to the level required for human interaction. Both
Vaudenay and Cˇagalj chose to bind the messages to random values earlier, which would have been subject to
a combinatorial attack had they not done so with more complex cryptography. The probability of a successful
attack on either their protocols or ours is essentially 2−b.
7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have analysed the strengths and weaknesses of a number of protocols that form a secure
network using empirical channels. We have introduced two new classes of such protocol: one (HCBK) that
relies on a trustworthy initiator, and one (SHCBK) that allows arbitrary group members to be corrupt. The
efﬁciency of these two classes (aside from the “committed” signals for HCBK) is as good as the best from
other, independently discovered protocols, in terms of human effort. There is every reason to believe that this is
optimal, since 2−b from b bits communicated is exactly what one would be conﬁdent of obtaining against any
protocol using a man-in-the-middle attack.
We have shown how the principles P1 and P2 lead to the design of correct protocols, in which we avoid
combinatorial attacks creating digest anomalies by distinguishing carefully between when a node is committed
to a value and when it knows it.
We have shown how data can be digestedmuch faster than it can be hashed, and begun to develop a satisfying
theory of digest functions as well as building some possible implementations of them that rely on the properties
of pseudo-random numbers. In a subsequent paper we will analyse the properties of digest functions in much
more depth, including giving the proof of the applicability of Toeplitz matrices in the ideal model.
We have brieﬂy introduced the concept of a local PKI, that is in effect the result of the run of one of our
protocols, since they bind information such as public keys, identities and context together in an authenticated
way. It is natural to ask how one can extend this analogy to allow for adding nodes, forming the union of
20 For example: INFOA should at least contains a public key of A, which is 1024 bits or 32 words already.
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two such groups etc. This of course raises interesting questions of how trust based on conﬁdence in particular
(initiator) nodes or perhaps subgroups ofG can extend in transitive ways. This will be a topic for future research.
It is natural to ask howprotocols of this formﬁt into the standardmodels and analysis tools for cryptographic
protocols. The answer is that our protocols are rather outside the standard models for two orthogonal reasons.
The ﬁrst is that they are group protocols with an arbitrary number of participants: most methods are only fully
developed for protocols with a small ﬁxed number.
The second is that they are intended to counter a much stronger attacker model than exists in the standard
models: one who can perform combinatorial searches. We are developing a modiﬁed version of the standard
CSP model for protocols that incorporates such a strong attacker and expect to report on that in a subsequent
paper.
The availability of protocols such as these immediately suggests a wide range of potential applications across
a wide range of domains. We see future research and development in this area as important. One topic that will
be important here is that of how humans can, efﬁciently and reliably, compare digests. There is likely to be a
tension between ease of use and ensuring compliance with the protocol. One way to compare two digests is to
inspect them visually and press “OK” or “ABORT” as appropriate. This is easy but humans can easily press
“OK”without actually checking. On the other hand, onemachine in the groupmay display the digest, which has
to be typed into all the others, which check if it corresponds to their own values. This is more work but cannot
be circumvented. Therefore human factors work will be important if this type of protocol is to be used widely.
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Appendix
A: Further assumption required for HCBK
In order to make the HCBK protocol secure we require that the non-initiator nodes are never allowed to get
involved in other runs between the acknowledgement signal sent in Message 2b and the ﬁnal agreement on the
short digest value. Otherwise the protocol will be vulnerable to a subtle attack, discovered by Roscoe in [34],
that again makes use of combinatorial search if it is possible for the intruder to block the empirical channel.
We shall consider the situation where there are two nodes, the initiator A and the non-initiator B. So in the
ﬁrst run , the protocol looks like this:
0.. A −→N B : A
1.. A −→N B : A, INFOA
B −→N I(A) : B, INFOB
I(B) −→N A : B, INFO′B
2.a.. A −→N B : longhash(kA)
2.b.. B −→E A : B’s acknowledgement
3.. A −→N I(B) : kA
I(A) −→N B : k ′A
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As can be seen from the run , inMessages 1 and 3, the original information INFOB and kA have been replaced
by the fake INFO′B and k ′A. This leads the protocol to three negative consequences:
• When B receives the incorrect key k ′A in Message 3, B cannot verify the correctness of the longhash sent in
Message 2. So B rejects it and aborts the run.
• In the mean time, the intruder obtains the original key, and therefore can determine the ﬁnal value d of the
digest in this run.
• Also note that the initiator, A, does not have any idea about the status of the current run, so s/he just keeps
waiting for Message 4a from B.
Meanwhile, the intruder starts a second run with B, posing as A:
0.. I(A) −→N B : A
1.. I(A) −→N B : A, INFOA
B −→N I(A) : B, INFOB
At this point the intruder knows all the information that B will use in run  to compute the digest, except
that run’s key k ′′A . It can therefore search for an k ′′A that will digest, together with that information, to d. If it
succeeds it continues:
2.a.. I(A) −→N B : longhash(k ′′A)
2.b.. B −→E A : The signal will be blocked by the intruder.
3.. I(A) −→N B : k ′′A
One of the main features in this run is that the acknowledgement signal sent over the empirical channel from
B to A inMessage 2.b. is blocked by the intruder. This avoids the possibility that the trustworthy initiator might
spot this message and realise that an attack is taking place.
After receiving k ′′A from Message 3., B will be able to check the correctness of the longhash sent in this run.
The ﬂaw of the protocol becomes apparent when B, thinking she is in the run , displays and compares the digest
of the run  with the digest of A in the run  over the empirical channel.
4.a.. B −→E A : digest(k ′′A , {INFOA, INFOB})
4.a.. A −→E B : digest(kA, {INFOA, INFO′B})
So in the end, A and B agree the equality of two digest values that have different antecedents.
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